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THE PRESIDENT REFUSES TO COHABIT:  
SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN TAIWAN 
Thomas Weishing Huang† 
Abstract:    French constitutional practices suggest that cohabitation between the 
president and the prime minister, where the latter is the leader of the opposition majority 
in parliament, creates a workable governmental relationship.  Taiwan’s constitutional 
practice indicates, however, that a minority government, although it does not command 
the majority in parliament, may nevertheless survive if the system of semi-
presidentialism is flawed.  Instead of having the flexibility to change the government 
whenever it loses the confidence of parliament, minority governments under semi-
presidentialism in Taiwan exhibit all the rigidity created by gridlock between the 
executive and the legislature. This gridlock is caused by fixed terms and dual legitimacies 
as found in pure presidentialism.  
A constitution that adopts the semi-presidential system must contain two essential 
features: if a stalemate needs to be unlocked, the president must have power, properly 
restricted, to initiate dissolution of parliament, and the president must respect the results 
of parliamentary elections, whether they be for or against his political interests.  To avoid 
a stalemate between the executive and the legislature, the Taiwanese constitution must be 
amended to include these features.  Because the gridlock prevents normal cooperation 
between the executive and the legislature, including the passage of necessary proposals 
for constitutional amendments in Taiwan, the assumption, that the prime minister may 
fall and change, but the president, under semi-presidentialisms, will serve out a fixed 
term, should be abandoned.   Instead of serving out a fixed term, the president may want 
to appeal to the electorate through plebiscites for a vote of confidence on his important 
political agenda, including constitutional amendments to cure the design flaws in the 
constitution.  As a short term and an immediate step to resolve the stalemate, the 
president should reach a political understanding with the opposition in parliament to go 
forward with proposals to amend the constitution and correct design defects. A successful 
return of referendum will allow the president to stay in office and dissolve the parliament 
under the amended constitution.  A negative return will mean that the president should 
resign to allow a new presidential election before the term is up. The possibility of 
resignation is a heretofore under-appreciated way, under semi-presidentialism, to break 
the gridlock between the executive and the legislature.  Contrary to conventional opinion, 
cohabitation is a desirable way to prevent governmental standstill.  In this sense, 
Taiwan’s failure to come up with a functional semi-presidential government derives not 
so much from the inherent defects of this regime type, as from the institutional and 
cultural environment in which it operates. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Taiwan has practiced a form of semi-presidentialism (see below) since 
1997, if not earlier.  Because of its short history of political liberalization 
(beginning in the 1990s) and the relatively few scholarly researched works 
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on semi-presidentialism, Taiwan’s situation has attracted little attention on a 
global scale.1  Under the current constitution, Taiwan has experienced 
continuous gridlock between the executive and the legislature since 2000.  
This seems to throw into question claims that semi-presidentialist 
governments enjoy both the regime stability of presidential governments and 
the flexibility of parliamentary systems.2  Most commentators in Taiwan 
seem resigned to the fact that further constitutional amendments are virtually 
impossible due to the opposition's refusal to join in the required super 
majority in parliament for initiating constitutional amendments.3  Since that 
is the case, there appears to be no feasible solution to the stalemate.4  Neither 
impression is accurate.  
This article will first describe the evolution of the concept of semi-
presidentialism, both in Taiwan and worldwide.  It will then explain how the 
institutional design of semi-presidentialism can resolve deadlocks between 
the executive and the legislature.  I intend to show that the stalemate 
between Taiwan’s president and the presidential cabinet on the one hand, and 
the legislature on the other, derives not so much from inherent difficulties of 
                                           
1 
 Perhaps with the two exceptions of Robert Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences 
and Contesting Explanations, 2 POL. STUD. REV. 314 (2004) and HORST H. BAHRO, Virtues and Vices of 
Semi-presidential Government, 11 J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. & PHIL. 5 (1999), which does include Taiwan as 
a semi-presidential regime.  The fact that the People’s Republic of China claims Taiwan as part of China, 
and Taiwan was recognized as a sovereign State only by 28 countries up to 2001, and is not a member of 
the UN, may also have contributed to the neglect of serious studies on its semi-presidential system.  
However, in addition to being an intellectually interesting case, I would argue that since Taiwan has 
maintained effective control over the islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu with a completely 
functional government (a political “unit” in Robert Dahl’s sense), the study of its government and 
constitution should not be affected by the waxing or waning of its international relations.  For the 
requirement as a political unit for political democratization, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS 
CRITICS 207-09 (1989).  For a similar idea (though termed “stateness” or   “nation-state”), see JUAN J. LINZ 
& ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, 
SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 25 (1996).  For the number of countries which recognize 
the Taiwan government, see Statistics, http://www.mofa.gov.tw/public/ 
attachment/471416105071.pdf (lasted visited April 20, 2005). 
2
  For an example of such a claim, see GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES 124-25 (2d ed. 1997); see 
also, Petra Schleiter & Edward Morgan-Jones, Semi-Presidential Regimes: Providing Flexibility or 
Generating Representation and Governance Problems?, http://government.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/ 
Working%20Papers/CSDG_WP05-1_Schleiter.pdf (last visited July 21, 2005). 
3
  The most recent constitutional amendment prescribes that any proposal for further constitutional 
revision shall be approved by the three-fourths of the legislators constituting the quorum.  It is not rocket 
science to figure out that amending the constitution is almost impossible for the government or the 
opposition to undertake alone, as neither one can control or mobilize enough legislators to its cause.  
ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA ZENGXIU TIAOWEN [Constitutional Amendment of the Republic of China] art. 
12 [hereinafter CONST. amend.].   
4
   Yureng Chou, Jiuqi xiuxianhou woguo zhongyangzhengfu tizhi zhi dingwei [The Nature of Our 
Central Government After the 1997 Constitutional Amendments], http://www.npf.org.tw/e-newsletter/ 
report/891209-R-1.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005) (“Except for making the president comply with the 
Constitution, there is nothing we can do.”). 
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this regime type but from haphazard constitutional drafting in 1997 and the 
particular political culture in Taiwan.  I also will demonstrate that semi-
presidential systems are not confined to either the super-presidential type,5 
or the sharing of executive power in the so-called cohabitation.6  A less 
effective minority government7 may nevertheless emerge under the semi-
presidential regime, as is the case in Taiwan, if the selection of the prime 
minister does not require the consent of parliament.  
Considering the presidential politics in Taiwan, I will argue that 
cohabitation, perhaps as the second-best choice, is not the necessary 
outcome where the president in a semi-presidential regime faces the 
opposition of the majority in parliament.  Despite ample historical 
precedents, scholars have failed to stress that resignation, or an offer thereof, 
by the president could be a legitimate strategic maneuver for ending the 
gridlock between the executive and the legislature in semi-presidential 
regimes.8  Obviously, there is no constitutional requirement that the 
president in a semi-presidential regime maintain the confidence of either the 
electorate or parliament during the fixed term.  The fixed term, however, 
would not be a barrier to solving Taiwan’s executive/legislative gridlock9 if 
the requirement that the president serve the term is abandoned.  I will argue 
that semi-presidential regimes should also require that the president posses 
the power to initiate the dissolution of parliament in order to break the 
executive/legislative gridlock, and that the constitution should contain 
                                           
5
  The term “super-presidentialism” has been used by scholars to define the situation where the 
president acts independently of party politics or parliamentary restraints in pursuing his own agenda, 
therefore, “super-presidential semi-presidentialism.”  See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. COLTON & CINDY SKACH, III 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CLUB OF MADRID, SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN RUSSIA AND POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE: AMELIORATING OR AGGRAVATING DEMOCRATIC POSSIBILITIES 7, 11, http://www.clubmadrid.org/ 
cmadrid/fileadmin/4-Colton_Skach.pdf (last visited May 10, 2006).  In this article, “super-presidentialism” 
refers simply to the fact that the president is able to lead the majority in parliament without usual restraints 
of checks and balances associated with pure presidentialism.  
6
   For descriptions of cohabitation in the French constitutional practice, see DIMITRI GEORGES 
LAVROFF, LE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL DE LA VE RÉPUBLIQUE 901-11 (3e éd. 1999). 
7
  The term refers to the fact that the prime minister does not control, but is supported, or at least not 
opposed, by the majority in the parliament.  For a classic study on this topic, see KAARE STRØM, MINORITY 
GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY RULE (1990). 
8
  The author first conceived this idea in Thomas Weishing Huang, Bulu iannan de zongtong: Lun 
xingzheng yu lifa jiangqu de taojie [The President’s Dilemma: Solving the Gridlock between the Executive 
and the Legislature], 46(4) FALING YUEKAN [THE LAW MONTHLY] 4 (2005). 
9
   An example of this assumption can be illustrated by Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary 
Democracy: Theoretical Observations, in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 52 (JUAN J. LINZ & 
ARTURO VALENZUELA eds., 1994) (“[T]he responsibility [under semi-presidentialism] becomes diffuse and 
additional conflicts are possible and even likely, creating situations in which a fixed term of office 
compounds the problem.”) (emphasis added).  A similar claim has been repeated in Mark Freeman, 
Constitutional Frameworks and Fragile Democracies: Choosing Between Parliamentarianism, 
Presidentialism and Semi-Presidentialism, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 257 (2000). 
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provisions for the president to accept the outcome of parliamentary elections 
to prevent the occurrence of government deadlock between the cabinet and 
parliament. 
II. SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM 
The term “semi-presidentialism” first entered mainstream academic 
discussions with the arrival of Maurice Duverger’s disposition of the concept 
around 1970.10  Later, in his 1980 article, discussing the practices of the 
French central government under the 1958 Constitution of the French Fifth 
Republic, Duverger established the definition of this regime type in the 
Western world.11  Today, scholars generally agree that this design is unlike 
the parliamentary system, where the prime minister heads the government 
and is usually a leader of the majority party, or at least supported by the 
majority consisting of a coalition of parties in parliament.  In such a system, 
the prime minister stays in power as long as he enjoys the majority's 
confidence.  Semi-presidentialism is also different from pure 
presidentialism, such as that practiced in the United States, under which the 
directly or indirectly elected president, to whom the cabinet is answerable, 
serves a fixed term and is the head of both the State and the government. The 
survival of the president and the cabinet does not depend on retaining 
Congressional confidence.   
Three features of semi-presidentialism place this regime somewhere 
between pure parliamentarism and presidentialism:  (1) The president is 
elected directly or indirectly (as before 1962 in the French Fifth Republic) 
by universal suffrage to a fixed term, and serves as head of the State;  (2) the 
prime minister is the head of the government and is responsible to 
parliament; and (3) the constitution gives the president considerable 
independent powers, which may include the authority to dissolve 
Parliament.12   
France, Weimar Germany, Finland, Austria, Ireland, Iceland, and 
Portugal were practicing semi-presidentialism by 1986.13  According to one 
                                           
10
  See Robert Elgie, The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism, in SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN EUROPE 1-2 
(Robert Elgie, ed, 1999).   
11
  Maurice Duverger, A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, 8 EUR. J. POL. 
RES. 165 (1980).  Some scholars prefer to call these constitutional designs simply “mixed constitutions.”  
See, e.g., Rett R. Ludwikowski, “Mixed” Constitutions—Product of an East-Central European 
Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 34 (1998). 
12
  Duverger, supra note 11, at 166. 
13
  MAURICE DUVERGER (dir.), LES REGIMES SEMI-PRESIDENTIELS 7 (1986). 
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account, by 1999,14 around fifty countries, particularly those considered part 
of the new wave of democratization,15 had adopted some form of semi-
presidentialism.  Other semi-presidential countries include Colombia, 
Guatemala, Mozambique, Peru, and Taiwan.16 
Some believe the superiority of semi-presidential regimes lies both in 
their ability to avoid the political gridlock so frequently associated with 
presidential systems and their fixed terms for the executive and the 
legislature.  When the president under a semi-presidential regime is 
supported by a parliamentary majority, he can confidently nominate a prime 
minister of his own choice who will enjoy the confidence of parliament.  If 
parliament is controlled by the opposing party, the president should appoint 
the leader of the opposition as prime minister, with whom he will cohabit by 
sharing executive powers.17   
Less attention, however, has been paid to situations in semi-
presidential regimes where parliament does not have a clear majority to 
either support or oppose the president.18 Historical precedents support the 
conclusion that resignation, or the offer thereof, by the president, combined 
with the holding of a referendum or plebiscite, are effective ways to resolve 
the deadlock between the executive and the legislature in such a situation.  
Recent literature on semi-presidentialism, however, has failed to identify this 
mechanism.  It is the contention of this article that by using the fate of his 
office to push his agenda during the fixed term, the president may effectively 
resolve the executive/legislative deadlock.   
                                           
14
  Elgie, supra note 10, at 14.  These countries included Angola, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bénin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, 
Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Slovenia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Togo, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  It is questionable, however, 
whether Azerbaijan, Guyana and Maldives should be considered countries which practice semi-
presidentialism.  The Azerbaijan prime minister is responsible to its president, instead of its parliament.  
AZER. CONST. art. 114.2. The Guyana cabinet, while whose prime minister and ministers must be selected 
from parliamentarians, does not appear to be responsible to parliament. GUY. CONST. art. 101.1. The 
Maldives constitution does not have a prime minister and the parliamentary censure is lodged against 
ministers.  MALDIVES CONST. art. 61.3. 
15
 By one account, there were more than thirty newly democratized countries in the world by 1991.  
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 21 
(1991).  
16
 See Elgie, supra note 1; Rafael M. Matrinez, Semi-Presidentialism: A Comparative Study 8 
(1999), http://www.essex.ac.uk/espr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/Mannheim/w13/martinez.pdf. 
17
 See Sartori, supra note 2, at 121-25. 
18
 Although Duverger clearly mentioned the possibility of a minority government under the semi-
presidential regime, the entire area of the minority government under any type of governmental structure 
seems to be underdeveloped.  See Duverger, supra note 13, at 52.  For treatment of this subject under 
parliamentary systems, see generally STRØM, supra note 7. 
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This possibility is unique under semi-presidentialisms.  Under pure 
presidential regimes, a president who threatens to resign does not create the 
pressure of a political vacuum because the constitution usually provides a 
succession plan in the event of presidential resignation.19  Under pure 
parliamentary regimes, the president usually does not possess enough 
constitutional power to actually make much of a difference.  His offer to 
resign, therefore, would not carry nearly as much weight as it would in a 
semi-presidential regime. 
III. EVOLUTION OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM IN TAIWAN 
The basic structure of Taiwan’s constitution was formulated by the 
Nationalist Government in 1947 during the Chinese Civil War.  Under this 
constitution, the central government was divided into five different Yuans, or 
branches, of government according to the political doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-
sen:20 the Executive Yuan,21 the Legislative Yuan,22 the Judiciary,23 the 
Control Yuan,24 and the Examination branch,25 with the office of the 
President on top.26  Many of the provisions of the 1947 Constitution were 
suspended by the so-called Provisional Articles27 until 1991 when these 
Articles were abolished.28  Although the constitution was suspended, 
academics in Taiwan continued to debate whether the governmental design 
under the 1947 constitution should be considered a presidential or a 
parliamentary system.29   
                                           
19
 See, for example, the succession plans under the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXV. 
20
 DENNY ROY, TAIWAN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 84 (2003). 
21
 ZHONGHUA MINGUO XIANFA [MINGUO XIANFA] [Constitution] arts. 53-61 (1947) (Taiwan). 
22
 Id. arts. 62-76.  
23
 Id. arts. 77-82. 
24
 Id. arts. 90-106. 
25
 Id. arts. 83-89. 
26
 Id. arts. 35-52. 
27
 Dongyuan kanluan shiqi linshi tiaokuan [Provisional Articles During the Period of Mobilization 
for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion] (1948, as amended 1972), in ZUIXIN LIUFA QUANSHU [NEW 
COMPILATION OF LAWS] (Tao Baichuan ed., 1980) [hereinafter Provisional Articles]. 
28
 ROY, supra note 20, at 185. 
29
 The opinions were just about evenly divided.  On the one hand, presidentialists argue that the 
existence of presidential independent powers, particularly the power to veto legislation, makes it a 
presidential system.  On the other hand, parliamentarians pointed out that the parliamentary consent 
required for the appointment of the prime minister, who could also be forced to resign by the Legislative 
Yuan, if the former chooses not to accept certain programs overridden by the Legislative Yuan after a 
presidential veto, resembles a cabinet system.  
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Under the 1947 constitution, the president enjoyed considerable 
independent powers,30 and the Provisional Articles gave the president even 
wider leverage, particularly through the emergency and discretionary 
powers.31  Although lacking certain mechanisms, such as power to dissolve 
the Legislative Yuan or the Control Yuan (an office of ombudsmen), the 
constitution did give the legislature a modified power of investiture, or a 
limited vote of confidence, over the appointment of the prime minister.32  It 
also contained a hybrid procedure for vetoing laws.33  Combined with the 
fact that the president was elected by an electoral college called the National 
Assembly34 and that the prime minister of the Executive Yuan was 
answerable to the Legislative Yuan (at least for “important policies”35 and 
“legislation, budgets and international agreements”36), one could argue that 
the system actually was similar to a semi-presidentialism. 
During the authoritarian rule of the Chiangs prior to 1988, the 
constitution also showed tremendous flexibility by vesting actual political 
power either in the hands of President Chiang Kai-shek, or of Chiang Ching-
kuo, the son and the successor strong man, during both his brief interval as 
prime minister from 1980 to 1981, and throughout his presidency37 until 
1988.  
In reality, the Chiangs ruled the island through the dominant 
Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang (“KMT”).38  The KMT originally 
consisted primarily of mainlanders who, with the Chiangs, evacuated 
mainland China after the Chinese communists triumphed in the Civil War.  
However, the growth of economic power in the middle class, as well as the 
                                           
30
 The president’s independent powers are considerable.  MINGUO XIANFA arts. 35 (Head of the 
State), 36 (Commander-in-Chief), 37 (authority to promulgate laws and decrees), 38 (diplomacy), 39, 41 
(emergency powers), 40 (pardon), 44 (arbitrage disputes among different Yuans), 55 (nomination of the 
Prime Minister), 79 (nomination of the head of the Judicial Yuan and constitutional judges), 84 
(nomination of members of the Control Yuan).  
31
 Provisional Articles, arts. 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, supra note 27, at 7. 
32
 MINGUO XIANFA art. 55. 
33
 Id.  MINGUO XIANFA arts. 57.1(2) and 57.1(3) prescribe that the prime minister may request the 
president to veto important policies or legislation, budgets, or international agreements passed by the 
Legislative Yuan which can then override the veto by two-third votes of legislators present at the meeting.  
In such case, the prime minister must either accept the program or resign.   
34
 MINGUO XIANFA art. 27.1. 
35
 Id. art. 57.1(2). 
36
 Id. art. 57.1(3).  This provision is now suspended and being replaced by constitutional 
amendments under which the scope and the power of the Legislative Yuan to override the president’s veto 
on “legislation, budgets and international agreements” are much more restricted.  See discussions in Part 
II.F. infra and supra note 33 for the original design.  
37
 See ROY, supra note 20, at 156. 
38
 Id. at 81-88.  For more sympathetic views on the KMT’s rule in Taiwan, see LINDA CHAO & 
RAMON H. MYERS, THE FIRST CHINESE DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINE ON 
TAIWAN 21-71 (1998). 
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sheer numerical superiority of the local Taiwanese over the mainlanders 
(approximately 83% to 17%) made change in the political landscape 
inevitable. 
Despite certain political leniencies on the Chiangs’ part, such as 
ending martial law and acquiescing to the formation of the opposition 
Democratic Progressive Party (“DPP”),39 Taiwan was under their 
authoritarian rule until Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988.  Upon his death, Lee 
Teng-hui, a Taiwanese, succeeded him as president.  Lee’s consolidation of 
power within the KMT and the DPP’s political ascendance led to the start of 
Taiwan’s political liberalization.  This liberalization included abolition of the 
Provisional Articles40 and no less than seven constitutional amendments, 
which, except for the last one, were initiated by the KMT without effective 
participation of the DPP.41   
Two of these constitutional changes, the third of the 1994 amendments 
and the fourth of the 1997 amendments, are of fundamental importance to 
the dynamic between the executive and the legislature.  Because Lee, a 
Taiwanese from a political party traditionally dominated by mainlanders, 
could no longer impose his agenda with an iron fist as did the Chiangs, he 
set out to create an electoral process in Taiwan that would allow for 
universal suffrage.  The result was the third constitutional amendment which 
allows the electorate in Taiwan to directly elect the president.42  A historical 
first election took place in 1996, resulting in Lee being elected the president 
with 54% of the votes cast.43   
With this system in place, Lee then wanted more freedom in selecting 
the prime minister.  He did not want his appointment dictated by factions 
within the KMT and the Legislative Yuan.  The DPP, however, having its 
political base largely in the Legislative Yuan as the opposition party, wanted 
some control over the executive branch.  The compromise was to design the 
relationship between the executive and the legislature after the constitution 
of the French Fifth Republic.  The resulting fourth constitutional amendment 
removed the power of investiture from the Legislature, added a mechanism 
for legislators to censure the prime minister, and provided for a presidential 
discretionary power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan upon a vote of no 
confidence over the prime minister.44  Due to the concerns of legislators and 
                                           
39
 ROY, supra note 20, at 174-78. 
40
 Id. at 174-75; see also Provisional Articles supra note 27.  
41
 CONST. amend., supra note 3.  The KMT was able to accomplish these tasks because it controlled 
the now abolished National Assembly which had the power to amend the constitution. 
42
 Id. art. 3. 
43
 ROY, supra note 20, at 201. 
44
  CONST. amend., supra note 3, art. 4. 
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the DPP, original proposals to add the vote of confidence and a presidential 
power to initiate dissolution of the Legislative Yuan were dropped.45  The 
result was a distorted semi-presidential design.46 
Although the liberalization process accelerated with the 2000 election 
and 2004 re-election of the DPP presidential candidate, Chen Shui-pian,47 
the constitutional design began to exhibit problems immediately after the 
2000 presidential election.  Elected by 39.4% of the vote in a three way 
race,48 and with the DPP having only 70 out of 225 seats (31.1%) in the 
Legislative Yuan,49 President Chen Shui-bian appointed General Tang Fei, a 
former minister of defense who was technically a member, but by no means 
the leader, of the opposition KMT party, to form the cabinet.50  The motive 
was to gain acceptance of the opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan and, 
more importantly, to prevent a military coup.  Tang’s cabinet included many 
politicians from the president’s own party, and therefore was not a true 
cohabitation of the president and the opposition party.  Because Tang was 
not in the position to rally the support of the opposition party legislators to 
support the executive, the cabinet was rather ineffective and lasted only 134 
days.51   
Once the threat of an immediate military coup proved to be over-
stated, and with Tang gone, Chen consecutively appointed three different 
politicians from his own party as prime minister.  These appointments 
followed the 2002 election for the legislators, in which the DPP captured 
only 87 out of 225 seats (38.7%),52  and the 2004 parliamentary election, 
which gave the DPP only two more seats in the Legislative Yuan.53  In the 
2004 elections, the KMT captured 79 seats and, with the support of the 34 
seats from the People’s First Party (PFP), claimed majority status in the 
legislature.  The KMT thus claimed the right to form the government which 
                                           
45
 Huang, supra note 8, at 15. 
46
 See id. at 4. 
47
 Central Election Commission Report, http://210.69.23.140/vote3.asp?pass1=A2004A00000 






 See ROY, supra note 20, at 232. 
51
 Statistics compiled by the Central Election Commission, http://210.69.23.140/cec/cechead.asp 
(last visited May 10, 2006).  After being in office only for 134 days, Tang was removed because of his 
disagreement with the president over the issue of the construction of the No. 4 nuclear power plant, and 
because of the false alarm of a military coup.  
52
 Id.; see Liu Bingkuan, Woguo yu faguo xianzheng tizhi zhi bijiao yanjou [Comparative Studies of 
the Constitutions of Our Country and France] 170 (2004) (Ph.D. dissertation, Zhongshan Graduate School), 
http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search-c/view_etd?URN=etd-0701104-112001&filename=etd-
0701104-112001.pdf (last visited April 23, 2006). 
53
 Id. 
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would have resulted in the president cohabiting with a prime minister from 
the opposition.  The president, however, refused and instead appointed a 
prime minister from his own party. 
Empirical studies have shown that it was very difficult for Chen’s 
minority government to get legislative proposals through the Legislative 
Yuan.54  In fact, one study shows that the government obtained approval of 
just 23 out of 149 priority programs (15.4%) submitted to the legislature in 
2004.55  On the other hand, the Legislative Yuan was able to pass legislation 
opposed and vetoed by the president.56  In addition to blocking legislation 
proposed by the executive, the legislature refused to exercise its 
constitutional advice and consent over the president’s nomination of 
members for the Control Yuan.57  To gain support from the Legislative Yuan, 
the DPP first approached the KMT in hopes of forming some sort of a 
coalition by offering portfolios to the later.  This overture was rejected.58  
The DPP then tried rapprochement with the PFP.  Although the move 
softened the opposition, the alliance has not given the DPP a solid majority 
in the legislature.59  Thus, there has been severe deadlock, if not a complete 
breakdown, between the executive and the legislature with no workable 
constitutional or political solution acceptable to all parties.  The reason for 
this failure is the subject of the next section. 
                                           
54
 Huang Xiurui, Shaoshu zhengfu zai guohui de kunjing [Difficulties of the Minority Government in 
Parliament], 7(2) TAIWAN ZHENGZHI XUEKAN [Taiwan Political Science Rev.] 39-40 (2003).  
55
 Liu Bingkuan, supra note 52, at 356, n. 1130. 
56
 The most recent example was the passage of the Statute on the Organization of the National 
Communications Commission, for which the Executive Yuan promptly petitioned the Council of Grand 
Justices (the constitutional court) for a constitutional interpretation.  For legal issues involved in this 
controversy, see Thomas Weishing Huang, [Rapporteur’s] Legal Memorandum to the Council of Grand 
Justices, Mar. 5, 2006 (on file with the Council and the author).  For a report on related earlier 
development, see DPP Caucus Holds Back on NCC Constitutional Ruling, Taipei Times, Nov. 11, 2005, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/11/11/2003279668  (last visit May 15, 2006).  
Another example was the controversy surrounding the enactment of the Statute for the Truth Commission 
which was vetoed by the president and then overridden by the legislature in 2003.  For a discussion of the 
constitutionality of the statute as decided by the Council of Grand Justices, see Thomas Weishing Huang, 
Huigui jiben: zong zhentiaohui tiaoli xianfa jieshian lun xingzheng yu lifa guanxi he quanli fenli [Back to 
Basics: On the Relationship Between the Executive and the Legislature and the Separation of Powers in the 
Constitutional Interpretation of the Statute for the Truth Commission], 56(2) FALING YUEKAN [THE LAW 
MONTHLY] 4 (2005).  
57
 DPP Sticks to Its Control Yuan Picks, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005 (on file with Pacific Rim Law 
& Policy Journal).  
58
 New Cabinet Post Is Same Old Wine in New Bottles, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005 (on file with 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).   
59
 DPP-PFP Coalition Seems Inevitable, TAIPEI TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005 (on file with Pacific Rim Law 
& Policy Journal).   
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IV. AVOIDING GRIDLOCK: A COMPARISON OF THE FRENCH & TAIWANESE 
PRACTICES   
Since it was KMT’s intention to install a French semi-presidential 
system in Taiwan in 1997, a comparison of the constitutional designs and 
practices between the two countries is in order.  Despite this intention, 
however, the comparison will show that there are critical differences in 
constitutional design and political culture resulting in dissimilar 
performances. 
A. Cohabitation 
After the 1986 election in France, in which the opposition leader 
Jacques Chirac commanded the majority in the Assemblée Nationale, 
President Francois Mitterrand declared that the president alone could 
nominate the premier.  He also declared that the president had to designate 
someone within the parliamentary majority, or at least someone who could 
withstand a vote of confidence or censure in parliament.60  As to the division 
of power between the president and the premier, Mitterrand made it clear 
that the president possessed authority under the constitution, particularly in 
the areas of foreign affairs and national defense.61  He also defined the role 
of the president as an arbiter of national interests and the guardian of 
constitutional values.62  These arrangements became known as cohabitation 
between the Left and the Right, which again took place in 1988, 1993-1995, 
and 1997-2002. 
Taiwan’s experience, however, indicates that cohabitation is by no 
means a necessary or logical course of action for semi-presidential regimes.  
The arrangement of cohabitation has not been seriously entertained since the 
2000 presidential election even though Chen and the DPP are currently 
confronted with the opposition-dominated Legislative Yuan.  However, the 
president may form a minority government because there is no requirement 
for investiture by the legislature after the prime minister is nominated.63  
While the legislature may initiate a vote of no confidence and a censure 
against the prime minister, the president may then (and only then) dissolve 
the legislature, making this course of action rather unattractive to the 
                                           
60
 See LAVROFF, supra note 6, at 906 (quoting Mitterrand). 
61
 For a summary of comments made by De Gaulle at a meeting with the drafting committee, see 
1 COMITÉ NATIONAL CHARGÉ DE LA PUBLICATION DES TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA 
VE RÉPUBLIQUE, DOCUMENTS POUR SERVIR À L’HISTOIRE DE L’ÉLABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION DU 4 
OCTOBRE 1958, at 237 (1987) [hereinafter 1L’ÉLABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION]. 
62
 Id. at 907. 
63
 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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opposition parties in the legislature.64  The opposition in a parliamentary 
system would normally only take this risk if, in its judgment, the country 
would favor political change by voting the opposition into the government.  
In sum, because the president is not constitutionally required to allow the 
majority to head the cabinet after the new election, there is absolutely no 
incentive for Taiwan’s opposition in legislature to initiate a vote of no 
confidence and be dissolved. 
There are three reasons why the semi-presidential constitutional 
design has failed to induce cohabitation in Taiwan.  First, prior to the recent 
political liberalization, Taiwan underwent a period of authoritarian rule from 
1945 to 1988.  Except for a brief period from 1981 to 1982 when Chiang 
Ching Kuo was prime minister, the political power was concentrated in the 
hands of the Chiangs as presidents.  Even during the political transformation 
led by President Lee Teng-hui, Lee effectively ruled the island through the 
KMT more or less as a strong president.  A political culture has thus been 
created where the president is not just a figurehead and the prime minister 
does not possess all executive powers.  Second, ancillary to the first reason 
and contrary to the French tradition, Taiwan has never had a strong 
legislature, let alone parliamentary sovereignty.  For this reason, the 
opposition in the Legislative Yuan is not comfortable with the idea of 
exercising the vote of no confidence and censure.  The opposition seems 
resigned to the fact that once the vote of no confidence passes, the only 
possible course of action from the president would be to dissolve the 
legislature.  However, no one is certain that this would indeed be his course 
of action, considering the potentially awkward timing and equal extent of 
trouble and expense to the legislators of the president’s own party.  Third, as 
Duveger points out, the circumstances under which semi-presidentialism is 
created and practiced affect the actual interpretation and expectation of the 
system.65  Through the 1997 constitutional reforms, Lee’s intention was to 
strengthen the power of the presidency by giving the president the authority 
to nominate the prime minister without the need for investiture by the 
legislature, and by adding the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan in the 
event of a censure.  The result was a strong presidency. 
                                           
64
 See discussion infra Part II.E.  However, if the president insists on appointing his own man after 
the new election, the opposition majority in the Legislative Yuan could continue to force the president to 
dissolve parliament by voting out the prime minister each time he appoints one.  It would be interesting to 
contemplate whom the electorate would eventually blame for the political instability.   
65
 DUVERGER, supra note 11, at 179-82.  
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B. Nomination of the Prime Minister 
The way the prime minister (and to some extent other cabinet 
ministers) is nominated and discharged sets the stage for interaction between 
the executive and the legislature.  With very few exceptions,66 the president 
under semi-presidentialisms enjoys at least the initial right to nominate the 
prime minister.67  Variations arise as to whether the president or the 
parliament has the ultimate authority to make the final decision.68  Because 
the president could potentially nominate a prime minister not aligned with 
majority interests, some semi-presidential constitutions stress that in 
choosing the prime minister, the president must take into account the 
election results69 or the party politics in parliament.70  In countries like 
France71 and Taiwan, however, the president has a freer hand in choosing the 
prime minister because the constitution does not require the prime minister 
to immediately seek a vote of confidence from parliament upon his 
appointment. 
In other semi-presidential systems, the legislature has the final say in 
the selection of the prime minister either because approval of the parliament 
is required,72 or because the parliament elects the prime minister as a matter 
of right.73 (Sometimes this right may be exercised only after the presidential 
nominee fails to meet parliamentary approval.)74  Therefore, the only way a 
president may nominate a prime minister without the need for ascertaining 
the intention of parliament first is through a constitutional design such as 
                                           
66
 Although it may be debatable to consider the Mongolian constitution a semi-presidential design, 
its parliament may, at its initiative, appoint and replace the prime minister.  MONG. CONST. art. 25(6) 
(1992). 
67
 This is normal under semi-presidentialisms, as is reflected by many examples.  See, e.g., 1958 
CONST. art. 8 (Fr.); PORT. CONST. art. 187(1) (1997). 
68
   E.g., DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES [Constitution], art. 53 (1919) (Weimar 
Republic). 
69
 E.g., PORT. CONST. art. 187(1) (“[T]aking the opinion of the parties represented in the Assembly . 
. . and with due regard for the results of the general election.”).  
70
  E.g., ROM. CONST. art. 102 (1) (1991) (“[C]onsultation with the party which has obtained absolute 
majority in Parliament, or—unless such majority exists—with the parties in Parliament.”); ANGL. CONST. 
art. 66(a) (1992) (“[A]ppoint the prime minister after hearing the political parties represented in the 
National Assembly.”); BENIN CONST. art. 54 (1990) (“[A]ppoint, after an advisory opinion of the National 
Assembly, the members of the Government . . . .”). 
71
 Lavroff, supra note 6, at 913.  But see, STRØM, supra note 7, at 79. 
72
   CROAT. CONST., art. 109 (2001); GHANA CONST. art. 78.1 (1992); HAITI CONST. art. 137 (1987); S. 
KOREA CONST. art. 86.1 (1948); KYRG. CONST. art. 46.1(B) (1993); LEB. CONST.  art. 53.2 (1990 as 
amended); LITH. CONST. art. 84.4 (1992); MACED. CONST. art. 90 (1991);  TOGO CONST. art. 78 (1992); 
UKR. CONST. art. 114 (1996); UZB. CONST. art. 93.9 (1992).  
73
  FIN. CONST. art. 61 (2000); MADAG. CONST. art. 90 (1992). 
74
  AZER. CONST. art. 118 (1995); POL. CONST. art. 154.3 (1997).  These processes are different from 
those under which Parliament initiates the nomination and selection of the candidate for the prime minister. 
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that of France and Taiwan, where no investiture is constitutionally required.  
The difference between the two countries is that French practice has 
developed into cohabitation and has therefore avoided potential gridlock, 
while Taiwan’s president has refused to cohabit, making deadlock between 
the executive and the legislature inevitable.  
C. Vote of Confidence 
Because, by definition, the prime minister and the cabinet are 
responsible to parliament in semi-presidential regimes, the prime minister 
must maintain parliament’s confidence to stay in power.  In contrast, under a 
pure presidential system, the cabinet is solely responsible to, and serves at 
the pleasure of, the president, and neither the president nor the cabinet 
legally needs to maintain the confidence of parliament during the term of the 
president.75  Therefore, in the case of a conflict between the parties 
occupying the office of the president and those in parliament, a deadlock 
occurs under the pure presidential, but not, under normal circumstances, in 
the semi-presidential regime.  In the latter case, the cabinet simply cannot 
survive.  
The vote of confidence comes in various shapes and forms.  As 
mentioned above, if the prime minister must obtain parliament’s consent 
immediately after his nomination, this power of investiture, in reality, is a 
vote of confidence.76  Allowing parliamentary voting on general programs or 
on particularly important projects, as practiced in France, is also a de facto 
vote of confidence, whether or not it is so designated.77  A more extreme 
form of a vote of confidence is one in which the prime minister designates a 
specific bill (un texte) as a matter which will require parliament to show its 
confidence in the cabinet.  Once designated, parliament is required to follow 
a special (frequently an expedited) procedure.78  Should the bill fail to pass, 
however, the prime minister must resign.79  In all three cases, there should 
not be gridlock between the executive and the legislature so long as the 
former maintains the confidence of the latter, or resigns if this confidence is 
lost. 
Part of the reason for the continuous gridlock between the executive 
and the legislature in Taiwan is the lack of the vote of confidence 
                                           
75
  The best example is the U.S. Constitution. 
76
  E.g., POL. CONST. art. 154; HAITI CONST. art. 158.1; LEB. CONST. art. 64.2; MACED. CONST. art. 
90. 
77
  1958 CONST. art. 49.1 (Fr.). 
78
  Id. art. 39.3. 
79
   Id. arts. 49.1, 49.3. 
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mechanism under the current constitution.  Although the constitution 
stipulates that the prime minister and the cabinet are responsible to the 
Legislative Yuan,80 there is neither the requirement for investiture, nor the 
provision for obtaining an indication of confidence by the legislature.  While 
the prime minister must explain his policies to, and be subject to legislative 
oversight,81 there is no constitutional consequence, even if the general 
programs or major projects are defeated in the Legislative Yuan.  In other 
words, the prime minister legally is not required to resign, unless, as is 
discussed below, the legislature initiates a vote of no confidence.  
A vote of confidence mechanism was proposed but not adopted during 
Taiwan’s 1997 constitutional reform,82 making gridlock between the 
executive and the legislature substantially more likely than with such a 
device. 
D. Vote of No Confidence 
Most semi-presidential regimes maintain the vote of no confidence 
mechanism by which parliament may, by its own initiative, vote the cabinet 
out of office.83  In a more extreme form, parliament is required to treat 
certain requests from the government as a matter of confidence and follow 
the procedure of a vote of no confidence.  For example, under the 1958 
French constitution, once the government attaches the question of 
confidence to its program, parliament must respond with a vote of no 
confidence in order to defeat these bills.84  The cabinet, therefore, will either 
prevail on its projects or be voted out of office.85  In either case, the potential 
deadlock between the executive and the legislature is avoided. 
In the 1997 Taiwan constitutional amendment, the vote of no 
confidence mechanism was indeed adopted.  Under the amendment, the 
legislature can initiate a vote of no confidence for any reason.  If a motion of 
no confidence is passed by an absolute majority of the Legislative Yuan, the 
cabinet has no choice but to resign, unless the president agrees to dissolve 
the Legislative Yuan.86  In addition to the modified veto system to be 
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  CONST. amend., supra note 3, art. 3. 
81
  Id. 
82
  Chou, supra note 4. 
83
  See, e.g., 1958 CONST. art. 49.2 (Fr.); ANGL. CONST. art. 88(n); PORT. CONST. art. 163(e); 
Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution], art. 74, ¶ 1 (Austria).; S. KOREA CONST. art. 63; FIN. 
CONST. art. 64; MONG. CONST. art. 43 (4); Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] 
arts. 103 (1), 117 (3) (Russ.); MINGUO XIANFA art. 115 (Taiwan). 
84
  1958 CONST. art. 39.3 (Fr.). 
85
  See JOHN BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 117-18 (1992) on the reasons for the design.  
86
  CONST. amend., supra note 3, art. 3.2(3). 
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discussed later,87 this mechanism appears to be the only alternative for the 
legislature to force the cabinet out of office and thus resolve any gridlock 
that may arise without this mechanism.  However, as was pointed out earlier, 
the Legislative Yuan has never seriously considered using the vote of no 
confidence despite serious deadlocks between the legislature and the 
minority government.  Because the prime minister, if defeated by a vote of 
no confidence, could request the president to dissolve the legislature, the 
latter has been hesitant in voting the cabinet out of office.  The Legislative 
Yuan knows that even if the opposition wins the new parliamentary election, 
cohabitation is not guaranteed. 
E. Dissolution of Parliament 
Almost all semi-presidential regimes equip the president with the 
power to dissolve parliament—some only in specified situations,88 others by 
the sole discretion of the president.89  By the power of dissolution, a new 
mandate may be sought from the electorate to solve the deadlock between 
the executive and the legislature.  Just like parliamentarism, if the return of 
the election is in favor of the government, the prime minister should stay in 
office.  If, on the other hand, the opposition clearly wins the new election, its 
leader should be invited to form a new government.  However, in a 
multiparty election, there may not be a clear majority either for or against 
the existing government.  In this case, the president may have some leeway 
in selecting the prime minister, and may create a minority government with 
no clear backing in parliament.  
In France, the presidential power to initiate a dissolution of parliament 
has turned into a weapon—one likely unforeseen by the constitutional 
makers.90  In other words, dissolution has been sought, not so much for 
breaking a stalemate or ascertaining the opinion of the electorate in order to 
form the government, but for furthering the president’s desire to have a 
working majority in parliament.  Thus, both in 1981 and 1988, Mitterrand 
dissolved the parliament right after the presidential election, which he had 
just won, to seek a majority of the Left in parliament.91  Later, in 1999, 
Chirac dissolved the parliament after he was elected president to create a 
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  See discussion infra notes 102 and 103 and the accompanying texts. 
88
  E.g., POL. CONST. art. 98(4) (limiting the president’s power to dissolve parliament to the situation 
where the parliament disagrees with the president’s nomination of the prime minister, but cannot produce 
one itself). 
89
  E.g., 1958 CONST. arts. 12(1), 12(3) (Fr.). 
90
  See Lavroff, supra note 6, at 868. 
91
  See id. at 869. 
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more workable Right majority even though the Right constituted the 
majority before the dissolution.92   
Perhaps because of this potential for abuse, some semi-presidential 
constitutions include restrictions far more stringent than those in the French 
constitution.  In addition to the French provision prohibiting the president 
from dissolving parliament within one year of a parliamentary election,93 
some constitutions also limit the power of dissolution in other 
circumstances.94  While it appears to be a necessary mechanism for breaking 
the executive/legislative deadlock, the device for dissolving parliament must 
be allowed with moderation. 
As mentioned above, Taiwan’s 1997 constitutional reform created the 
mechanism for the president to dissolve the legislature at the request of the 
prime minister through a vote of no confidence.95  So far, there has been 
only one attempt for a vote of no confidence, which the DPP launched as a 
symbolic gesture with no chance of success.96  As a result, there has never 
been dissolution of the Legislative Yuan by the president.  Because the 
president cannot initiate the dissolution, he has not been able to resolve the 
gridlock between the Executive and the Legislative Yuan.  The president’s 
reactive power to dissolve the legislature, therefore, may be effective in 
intimidating the latter and thus preventing it from voting no confidence in 
the prime minister, but it has been rather ineffective as a design to break the 
executive/legislative stalemate.      
F. Veto 
A surprising number of semi-presidential regimes have adopted the 
so-called “revisionary power” on the part of the executive—first conceived 
by the U.S. constitution97—but with many variations.  The most benign form 
consists of the French president’s right to return a bill to parliament for 
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  Id. at 870. 
93
  1958 CONST. art. 12 (4) (Fr.). 
94
  E.g., NIGER CONST. art. 89 (1999) (limited to vote of no confidence); Konst. RF art. 117.4 (Russ.) 
(same); SLOVN. CONST. art. 117 (2004) (same); SRI LANKA CONST. art. 49.2 (1978) (same); GEOR. CONST. 
art. 81.1 (1998) (no confidence vote for the second time); KYRG. CONST. art. 71.5 (1993) (same); MADAG. 
CONST. art. 95 (same); POL. CONST. art. 155 (when parliament can neither agree to the president's 
nomination of prime minister, nor select its own); ROM. CONST. art. 89.1 (same).  One of the most original 
designs is the Lithuanian Constitution under which the newly elected parliament could by 3/5 votes force 
the president to resign.  LITH. CONST. art. 87.  
95
  See discussion supra Part II.D. 
96
  Huang, supra note 8, at 14. 
97
  See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 336 
(Bicentennial ed. 1987); see also THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
DEBATES 120-24, 247-48 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). 
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reconsideration.  On the surface, this power bears some resemblance to the 
veto authority of the U.S. president, except that in France, parliament is not 
required to acquire more votes upon reconsideration of the bill.98  Many 
other semi-presidential constitutions, however, do require parliament to 
override the president’s veto with higher voting standards, be that an 
absolute majority99 or a super-majority.100   
Regardless of the overriding veto requirements, the result of the 
exercise of this power will either be a defeat of the bill favored by the 
opposition, or a forced acceptance of a bill with which the president 
disagrees.  The more stringent the requirement for overriding a presidential 
veto, the more likely a stalemate will ensue, as the majority is unable to pass 
its desired legislation.  Most commentators agree that there is no solution to 
this gridlock under a pure presidential system.101  Under semi-presidential 
constitutions, however, this mechanism is not the only tool available to the 
president for breaking the deadlock between the executive and the 
legislature. 
Whatever flaws Taiwan's 1947 constitution may contain, one of its 
most amazing features is its veto mechanism.  Alleging that the aim was to 
create a modified parliamentary system, the drafters of the 1947 constitution 
included both a mild form of the mechanism for the vote of confidence102 
and the veto mechanism, which is usually seen only in pure presidential 
regimes.103  Although there is no evidence that this innovative design has 
actually influenced the design of other semi-presidential constitutions, it 
must be said that the 1947 constitution was far ahead of the trend in this 
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 1958 CONST. art. 10 (2) (Fr.). 
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 Depending on the nature of the bills, the requirement to override shall be an absolute majority or a 
two-thirds vote (for example, treaties).  PORT. CONST. art. 123(1)-(3). 
100
 E.g., POL. CONST. art. 122(5) (requires three-fourths of the legislators present at the voting). 
101
 José A. Cheibub, Presidentialism and Democratic Performance, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOCRACY 111 (Andres 
Reynolds ed., 2002). 
102
 The 1947 constitution stipulated that the Legislative Yuan may vote to change the important 
policies of the Executive Yuan.  With the consent of the president, the Executive Yuan may veto such 
changes to which the Legislative Yuan may override the veto by a vote of the two-thirds of the legislators 
present for voting.  In such a case, the premier may accept the change or resign.  MINGUO XIANFA art 
57.1(2).  This hybrid provision of vote of no confidence and veto mechanism was abolished by the 1997 
constitutional amendments.  CONST. amend., supra note 3, art. 3.2.; NEW COMPILATION OF LAWS, supra 
note 27, at 2. 
103
 The 1947 constitution prescribes that, with the consent of the president, the Executive Yuan may 
return the legal or budgetary bills, or treaties to the Legislative Yuan for reconsideration.  The latter, 
however, may by a two-thirds vote of those present at the meeting override the President’s veto.  In such a 
case, the Premier shall either accept the bill or the treaty, or resign.  MINGUO XIANFA art. 57.1(3); NEW 
COMPILATION OF LAWS , supra note 27, at 2.  This provision is substantially retained by the 1997 
constitutional amendment with a change of the requirement for overriding the veto to an absolute majority 
of the Legislative Yuan.  CONST. amend., supra note 3, art. 3.2(2). 
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regard.  However, this mechanism has not solved the basic inconsistency in 
policies between the executive and the legislature because the prime minister 
may choose to accept the overridden legislation and stay in office. 
G. Strengthening the Presidency and Rationalizing Parliament 
One of the greatest concerns of French President Charles de Gaulle 
and the other drafters of the constitution of the French Fifth Republic was 
how to control the unruly assemblies for the sake of a stable government.104  
Their partial answer was to strengthen the presidency and rationalize 
parliament.105   
De Gaulle believed strongly that the executive power should derive 
from the president, rather than parliament.  In his famous 1946 Bayeux 
Manifesto, he stated:  “[T]he executive power ought to emanate from the 
chief of state, place above the parties, elected by a body which includes the 
parliament but which is much larger and is composed in such a manner as to 
make him the president of the French Union, as well as of the Republic.”106  
In his view, the president externally represents the State.  Internally, the 
president should have substantial power over national security; appointment 
of personnel, including the premier; and serve as the arbiter of national 
interests.  All these powers are to be independent from the parliamentary 
sovereignty.107 
Much more innovative is the way the French drafters conceived to 
“rationalize” parliament.  From the very beginning, methods were devised to 
curtail the power of parliament.  The period of time that parliament is in 
regular session is limited to 186 days per year.108  Executive bills enjoy 
priority over private bills from the members of parliament.109  The prime 
minister may make a bill a question of confidence thereby forcing the 
Assemblée to follow a much tighter schedule of a vote of no confidence in 
order to have any chance of defeating the designated bill.110  As a result, and 
exactly as the president of the parliamentary consultative committee had 
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 Id. at 3, 6.  For an English translation of the excerpt of this declaration, see AREND LIJPHART, 
PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 139, 140-41 (1992). 
107
 See, e.g., 1 L’ÉLABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 258. 
108
 Lavroff, supra note 6, at 611.  For the standard treatments in this regard of the French 1958 
Constitution in English, see BELL, supra note 85, at 78-137. 
109
 This is achieved by government’s setting the parliamentary agenda.  1958 CONST. art. 48 (Fr.); see 
BELL, supra note 85, at 18, 125.  
110
 1958 CONST. art. 49(3) (Fr.) (Once so designated, the National Assembly only has 24 hours to 
decide.) 
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forewarned, parliament has been reduced to voting “yes” or “no” without 
much time for deliberation or debate.111 
The practices under Taiwan’s constitution have been very different.  
First of all, the constitution does not provide a similar mechanism under 
which the executive may force its way through by demanding a vote of 
confidence on government projects or bills.  Second, under the influence of 
the German concept of “statutory reservation,”112 and due to the 
interpretation of the Council of Grand Justices (the constitutional court), vast 
areas, particularly those concerning civil and political rights, have been 
reserved for legislative deliberation.113  Thus, Taiwan is moving in the 
opposite direction of French practices.  There are merits to Taiwan’s 
practices, especially in light of the transitional nature of Taiwan’s polity that 
requires corrections of many past administrative abuses of the authoritarian 
regime; it is not guaranteed however, that a prolonged practice will be 
compatible with the nature of the semi-presidential design in the long run. 
H. Plebiscites 
Plebiscites are not the invention of the French Fifth Republic.  Many 
constitutions which could be classified as semi-presidential incorporated 
plebiscites long before the 1958 French Constitution did.  For example, the 
right of the president to resort to plebiscites existed under the Weimar, the 
Austrian, and the Icelandic constitutions at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.114  However, plebiscites do have a particular affinity to the 1958 
French constitution in the sense that de Gaulle insisted that there must be a 
way for the president to connect directly with the people.115  He also enticed 
the parliamentary constitutional consultative committee with the argument 
that the right to initiate plebiscites would make the president less likely to 
dissolve parliament.116  Commentators believe, therefore, that plebiscites 
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were adopted to break the stalemate between the executive and the 
legislature by resorting to the electorate as the arbiter.117  
Although plebiscites may be effective methods for solving the 
executive/legislative stalemate in some situations, Taiwan’s Law of 
Referendum has played a very limited or almost nonexistent role in this 
regard.  Under the current law, the president may resort to plebiscites only 
on topics concerning national security.118  Under the most recent 
constitutional amendment in Taiwan, there is a previously unavailable 
mechanism for amending the constitution by referendum.119  However, it 
requires the approval of proposed amendments by three-fourths of the 
legislators present, and thus is a very high hurdle.120  Accordingly, in order to 
use plebiscites to help resolve the executive/legislative gridlock, the current 
Law of Referendum must be revised to allow the president to use it more 
effectively.  In addition, in order to improve the constitutional semi-
presidential design, the constitution must first be revised in conjunction with 
holding a referendum. 
I. Constitutional Review 
In view of the traditional French attitude toward parliamentary 
sovereignty and judicial review, acceptance of any form of constitutional 
review would have been a struggle.121  The decision to move away from the 
“sovereignty of the Assembly” and to increase the power of the president 
and the gouvernement, however, forced the drafters of the French Fifth 
Republic to entertain the idea of judicial review.  Although the suggestion of 
having a constitutional court with appellate jurisdiction over the  Cour de 
Cassation or the Conseil d’Étate (respectively the highest ordinary and 
administrative courts) was rejected early in the game,122 one of the chief 
constitutional designers, Michel Debré, decided that it was important to have 
a third organization outside the executive and the legislature to arbitrate 
conflicts between the two123 and perhaps make some sense out of the 
uncharted course presented by the new constitutional design, particularly the 
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uncertain division of legislative power.  Under this thinking, and also for the 
purpose of curbing traditional parliamentary power,124 the French 
Constitutional Council (le Conseil Constitutionnel) was born. 
For almost fifty years, the French Constitutional Council has been 
frequently called upon to resolve conflicts between the executive and 
parliament.  Unsurprisingly, the Council has been asked to make delicate 
decisions regarding the allocation of executive and legislative power under 
Article 34 of the Constitution, much as the drafters had anticipated.125  A 
much more active use of the Council came from the parliamentary minority's 
request for constitutional opinions.126  For a very long period of time during 
which the government controlled the parliamentary majority, this was 
virtually the only weapon the minority had to counter government 
proposals.127  
Although it may be too strong a claim to say that constitutional review 
is required under semi-presidential regimes, this mechanism, as France and 
other countries have demonstrated, is useful in resolving gridlocks between 
parliament and the government.  In this sense, Taiwan has been lucky that 
the Council of Grand Justices, created under the 1947 Constitution, serves as 
a constitutional court.128  Its jurisdiction has continued to expand either 
through its own interpretation of the Constitution or by the addition of power 
to the enabling statute.  Its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret constitutional 
issues arising in lower courts, for instance, was created by interpretation.129  
Similar to the power of the German Constitutional Court130 and the French 
Constitutional Council after 1974,131 the Taiwanese enabling statute gave the 
Council of Grand Justices the power to hear petitions on constitutional issues 
lodged by one-third of the legislators.132  In practice, the Council of Grand 
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Justices has been called upon on many occasions to resolve conflicts 
between the executive and the legislature.133  It is unclear however, how the 
Justices of the Council would rule on the issue of constitutional cohabitation, 
or the refusal thereof, should it be put before them. 
V. HOW TO BREAK THE STALEMATE 
Study of the French Fifth Republic and Taiwan, reveals that there are 
two main ways to break the executive/legislative stalemate.  First, the 
president must be able to initiate the dissolution of parliament.  If the power 
to dissolve parliament is passive and can only be a response to a 
parliamentary vote of no confidence, the opposition in parliament must be 
willing to use the mechanism of no confidence to end, or allow the president 
to break the gridlock.  Second, whenever the return of a parliamentary 
election does not favor the president’s own political party, the president must 
be willing to share the executive power with a prime minister who can 
effectively lead the majority in parliament.  Only together will these 
strategies prevent the stalemate from occurring. 
A. Improving Semi-Presidentialism 
Most observers agree that the semi-presidential design of Taiwan's 
Constitution has functioned rather poorly.134  While the opposition controls 
the legislature, the president nevertheless has refused to appoint and cohabit 
with a prime minister who theoretically might be able to mobilize 
parliament.  The executive/legislative stalemate seems to be entrenched 
within the constitutional design, and has not added flexibility by way of a 
responsive cabinet.  Many commentators have therefore asserted that the 
system has inherent flaws as a governmental design.135  They have 
advocated either a return to the pre-1997 cabinet system, that they claimed 
existed,136 or a re-design to a U.S.-style presidential system.137  Both 
recommendations are off the mark. 
The current debates concerning the constitutional design in Taiwan 
resemble the arguments surrounding the choice between a presidential or a 
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parliamentary system in American academic circles in the 1980s and 90s.138  
Most of the remarks are therefore quite familiar and uninspiring.  
Executive/legislative deadlocks caused by either dual democratic 
legitimacies or the lack of immediate response to a change in the will of the 
electorate are the most commonly mentioned defects of pure presidential 
systems.139  At the same time, others have cited the potential for 
governmental instability and the difficulty of having a State figurehead act 
contrary to the political culture as reasons for rejecting the cabinet system in 
Taiwan.140  Despite their differences, parliamentarians and presidentialists 
seem to join in their attack against semi-presidential systems for the so-
called lack of political responsibility on the part of the elected president.141  
Compared with the cabinet system, there may be some truth in such a claim.  
Compared with the presidency, however, the claim is completely 
inaccurate.142  
This is not to say that semi-presidental regimes have no theoretical or 
institutional difficulties as constitutional designs for democratic 
governments.  The first issue is the “unchecked power” of the presidency.  
Looking back at the history of constitutional development, the design of an 
elected president with considerable constitutional powers is an obvious 
imitation of enlightened monarchies prior to their development into the 
modern cabinet system, under which the power of the monarch is usually 
only symbolic.143  The forerunner of this design under semi-presidentialism, 
the Weimar Constitution, appeared to have been influenced not only by 
Germany’s own strong monarchical tradition, but also by the concept of the 
charismatic leader conceived by Max Weber, one of its constitutional 
drafters.144 Similar to the concept of a charismatic leader, one who is not 
supposed to be restricted by bureaucratic rules and organizations,145 de 
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Gaulle and his constitutional advisors advocated having the president as the 
arbiter of national interests, above and beyond petty party politics.146  
Whether the president enjoys considerable constitutional powers, 
however, may not in and of itself dictate the success or failure of a 
constitutional design under which the cabinet is answerable to parliament. 
The success of the French Fifth Republic is evidence of this proposition.  
Although the Weimar Constitution with its strong presidential powers was a 
failure, the semi-presidential design under the French Fifth Republic which 
has employed a similar strong presidentialism has worked reasonably well.  
While fragmentation of the parties in Weimar failed to produce an effective 
government, the French have been able to reduce fragmentation to a 
manageable level, particularly with the dual-run electoral system which 
divides parties into two camps.  
The second issue with semi-presidentialism is presented by the fact 
that the minority governments in Taiwan, despite the difficulties they have 
encountered, have survived.  Although minority governments in 
parliamentary systems do not necessarily create paralyzing 
executive/legislative stalemates,147 in such systems the prime minister must 
be able to lead the parliament, either through a coalition, or through the 
support of the majority.  Such support may be given or accepted reluctantly, 
and when the executive cannot achieve its goals due to lack of parliamentary 
cooperation, deadlock often results.  In this situation the prime minister can 
either resign or request dissolution of parliament and a new election from the 
president or the monarch.  As was pointed out earlier, under the current 
constitutional design in Taiwan, the president does not have the power to 
initiate dissolution of the Legislative Yuan in order to break the deadlock.  At 
the same time, the president is unwilling to take the high road by foregoing 
the minority government, and by appointing the leader of the majority in 
parliament as the prime minister.   
This leads to the third cause of the failure of the semi-presidential 
design in Taiwan:  there is no parliamentary tradition or mechanism which 
prompts the president to cohabit with the opposition leader as the prime 
minister.  While the political culture of the parliamentary tradition in France 
cannot be created overnight, some constitutions in newly created 
democracies use institutional design to reduce the president’s insistence on 
forming minority governments with politicians from his own party as the 
prime minister.  Some of these constitutions mandate that the president 
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invite the leader of the largest party or the coalition majority as prime 
minister,148 reducing the chance for a minority government in the first place.  
Others stipulate that after several failed attempts by the president to 
nominate the prime minister, parliament may step in and elect the prime 
minister, who will then be appointed by the president.149 
B. Vote of Confidence on the President 
While not every device for resolving the executive/legislative 
deadlock in the 1947 Constitution and its subsequent amendments is 
dysfunctional, a few additional mechanisms need to be in place for a 
smoother operation.  However, the above suggestions for improving the 
electoral system and the constitutional design—by allowing for the 
dissolution of parliament, or by requiring the president to involuntarily 
cohabit with opposition leaders—together with a change in political culture, 
obviously cannot be achieved immediately.  The vicious cycle of stalemate 
presents an added difficulty:  the president will not appoint an opposition 
leader as the prime minister, and the opposition reciprocates by refusing to 
cooperate with the president in carrying out his presidential agenda, 
including necessary constitutional revisions (which require parliamentary 
initiative) to improve the semi-presidential design.  
The question then becomes, is there any mechanism under Taiwan’s 
flawed semi-presidentialism that can break the executive/legislative 
stalemate?  There is one way, which will require considerable political 
courage on the part of the president.  The president should offer to stay or 
resign depending on the outcome of a national plebiscite for constitutional 
amendments which will give the president the power to initiate dissolution 
of the Legislative Yuan.  If the electorate agrees with the president, the 
president should remain in office, immediately dissolve parliament, and seek 
a new national mandate that is likely to favor the president’s party under the 
circumstances.  In case the president fails to persuade the electorate to go 
along with the constitutional amendments, he should resign and call for a 
new national election.  To deal with the situation in which the president and 
the majority of the parliament again belong to opposition parties or a 
coalition of parties, constitutional amendments should include the 
arrangements suggested in the last section—that the president must cohabit 
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with the opposition.150 
Perhaps, because most presidents under semi-presidential regimes 
possess the power to dissolve parliament, there is normally no need to resort 
to the threat of resignation.  It must be noted however, that even if the 
constitution does grant the president the power to dissolve parliament, such 
power normally may not be exercised at will under all circumstances.  For 
example, many constitutions stipulate that the president may not dissolve 
parliament during the year following the parliamentary election.  Whether or 
not the power to dissolve parliament is subject to restrictions, the president, 
as de Gaulle did on several occasions, may appeal to the public to arbitrate 
in order to carry out important items on the presidential agenda that have 
been crippled by the government stalemate. 
The above described idea derives from abandoning the assumption 
that the president under semi-presidential regimes must, much like the 
president under pure presidentialism, serve out fixed terms.  De Gaulle’s 
offering to resign several times during his terms, if the electorate disagreed 
with his proposals during the plebiscite, provides a precedent for this 
practice.  In other words, to break the executive/legislative deadlocks, the 
president must think like a parliamentarian.  After all, prime ministers under 
parliamentary systems put their political lives on the line and request votes 
of confidence from parliament all the time.  Why can't presidents under 
semi-presidential regimes do the same?  The national plebiscite could then 
be viewed as the functional equivalent of a vote of confidence on the 
executive under a pure parliamentary regime. 
There are incentives both for the president and the opposition to opt 
for this extra-ordinary course of action.  The president will be able to 
improve the constitutional design and possibly realign the political forces in 
parliament.  The opposition will benefit from constitutional amendments 
requiring the president to invite the leaders of the opposition majority to 
form the government after the election.  Most important, if the president fails 
in these efforts, the opposition gets an earlier crack at capturing the 
presidency. 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: A PRESIDENTIAL DESIGN WITH 
PARLIAMENTARY FLEXIBILITY 
Although Taiwan’s semi-presidential system has a limited history, it 
presents an interesting case study for students of government and 
constitutional design.  Its lessons may not be so much about what a semi-
presidential regime can do in a transitional democracy, but rather what not to 
do when a government tries to imitate a semi-presidential system.  One may 
argue that one purpose of semi-presidentialism is to allow the president 
wider latitude in national politics, including the selection and dismissal of 
the prime minister, where he is given the right of first refusal.  But, if and 
when a dysfunctional minority government comes into existence during the 
term of the president, the constitution requires mechanisms to create a new 
national mandate by the dissolution of parliament.  The president must then 
obey the new mandate by allowing himself to cohabit with the opposition.  
To break the vicious cycle of government stalemate and to amend the 
constitution to include these mechanisms, the president may offer to resign 
prior to the end of his term, so that the electorate has a chance to approve or 
disapprove the constitutional proposals and render a new mandate to 
eliminate the paralyzing governmental gridlock. 
